The Design Argument
"Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made." (Rom. 1:20 RSV)
Ancient Foundations
Ancient Greek philosophers were struck by cosmic order. Plato identified two arguments for God's existence: the soul's existence and "the order of the motion of the stars, and of all things under the dominion of the Mind which ordered the universe." He concluded there must be a "best soul" who is the "Maker and Father of all."
Aristotle, observing the night sky, imagined people emerging from underground caves suddenly seeing the cosmos: "when they should behold all these things, most certainly they would have judged both that there exist gods and that all these marvelous works are the handiwork of the gods." He argued for a First Uncaused Cause—a living, intelligent, eternal being who is the source of cosmic order. see: Belief in God as Properly Basic
The Rebirth of Design
Modern astronomy has reached similar conclusions. Scientists once assumed that given sufficient time, intelligent life would eventually evolve somewhere. Recent discoveries prove this assumption wrong.
Astronomers have discovered that the universe requires an extraordinarily complex and delicate balance of initial conditions to permit intelligent life anywhere in the cosmos. This "fine-tuning" involves a complexity that literally defies human comprehension.
Two Kinds of Fine-Tuning
Constants of Nature: When natural laws are expressed mathematically, certain constants appear (like the gravitational constant G in Newton's law: F = Gm₁m₂/r²). These constants' values aren't determined by the laws themselves—universes could exist with the same laws but different constant values.
Arbitrary Quantities: Initial conditions like the universe's entropy level that laws operate upon but don't determine.
Fine-tuning means these constants and quantities must fall within an extraordinarily narrow range for the universe to be life-permitting.
Examples of Fine-Tuning
To grasp the delicacy involved, consider these numbers:
Seconds in universe history: ~10¹⁷
Subatomic particles in known universe: ~10⁸⁰
Astronomer Luke Barnes (2016) identified key finely tuned constants that govern the fundamental forces and particles making life possible. Here are three striking examples:
Cosmological constant [(2.3 x 10⁻³ eV)⁴]: Controls the universe's expansion rate. Too large and galaxies never form; too small and the universe collapses before stars ignite.
Strong nuclear force coupling (0.1187): Binds quarks into protons/neutrons and nuclei together. Weaker values prevent nuclear formation; stronger values prevent hydrogen.
Universe entropy (4 × 10⁸¹ J/K): Determines the "arrow of time" and energy gradients necessary for stars, chemistry, and life processes.
For a complete list of fine-tuned constants with detailed explanations, see Fine-Tuned Constants and Life-Permitting Parameters of the Universe.
The Extraordinary Precision Required
The degree of fine-tuning required for these constants is beyond comprehension. Consider these specific examples:
The weak nuclear force: Alteration by even one part in
10^100would prevent a life-permitting universe¹The cosmological constant: A change by as little as one part in
10^120would render the universe life-prohibiting²Universe's low-entropy initial state: The odds of this condition existing by chance are one in
10^(10^123)—a number so vast that Oxford physicist Roger Penrose comments, "I cannot even recall seeing anything else in physics whose accuracy is known to approach, even remotely, a figure like one part in10^(10^123)"³
Having accuracy of one part in 10^60 is like firing a bullet toward the other side of the observable universe (20 billion light-years away) and hitting a one-inch target.
Why the Universe’s Low Initial Entropy Matters
In gravitational systems, a smooth, nearly uniform early universe corresponds to a low‑entropy macrostate. That special beginning allows entropy to increase thereafter, grounding the thermodynamic “arrow of time” and creating the energy gradients that enable stars, chemistry, and life (Lebowitz 2008).
Roger Penrose famously estimated the phase‑space fraction for such a low‑entropy beginning at roughly 1 in 10^(10^123)—an unimaginably tiny target (Penrose 2005). Inflation explains large‑scale uniformity but, by itself, does not remove the need for a low‑entropy past (Carroll & Chen 2004; Carroll 2010).
Addressing Objections
"Different constants might allow different life forms": This underestimates the consequences. Scientists define "life" broadly as organisms that take in food, extract energy, grow, adapt, and reproduce. Without fine-tuning, not even matter or chemistry would exist.
"Different laws might avoid these problems": We're only concerned with universes governed by our laws but with different constants. Among such universes, almost none would be life-permitting.
The Design Argument
The formal argument structure:
The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.
It is not due to physical necessity or chance.
Therefore, it is due to design.
This argument does an "end run" around biological evolution debates by focusing on cosmic conditions that make any evolution possible.
Design Inference Framework
The inference to design follows the pattern of "inference to the best explanation" rather than analogy. John Leslie's concept of "tidy explanations" illustrates this: if someone born on August 8, 1949 receives a car with license plate "BOB 8849," this suggests design rather than coincidence, despite all license plates being equally improbable.
William Dembski formalizes this through "specified complexity"—events that are both highly improbable and conform to an independent pattern. Robin Collins uses Bayes's theorem to show that fine-tuning strongly confirms theism over atheism, demonstrating that the existence of embodied, conscious observers is much more probable on the hypothesis of theism than on atheism.
Against Physical Necessity
This alternative claims constants must have their observed values, making life-prohibiting universes physically impossible. This seems implausible because:
Life-prohibiting universes appear physically possible
Constants aren't determined by natural laws
Even a "theory of everything" wouldn't explain everything (e.g., M-theory requires eleven dimensions but can't explain why)
Laws require initial conditions that aren't determined by the laws themselves
M-theory permits ~10⁵⁰⁰ different universes, almost all life-prohibiting
Attempts to eliminate fine-tuning typically create new fine-tuning elsewhere (e.g., inflationary models requiring cosmological constant tuning to one part in 10⁵³)
No evidence suggests life-permitting universes are physically necessary
Against Chance
The fundamental problem is the remote probability that our universe would be life-permitting by accident.
The Probability Illustration: Imagine dots on paper representing possible universes—red for life-permitting, blue for life-prohibiting. The result is "a sea of blue with only a few pinpoints of red."
The Lottery Analogy: Critics use lottery analogies incorrectly. The proper analogy: billions of white ping-pong balls mixed with one black ball. If black means you live, white means death. Any particular ball is equally improbable, but it's overwhelmingly more probable you'll get white rather than black. If you get black, you should suspect the lottery was rigged.
The Anthropic Principle: Some argue no explanation is needed because we can only observe life-permitting universes. This reasoning is fallacious. Analogy: facing a firing squad of 100 marksmen who all miss, you shouldn't conclude "I shouldn't be surprised they missed—if they hadn't, I wouldn't be here to observe it!" You should still be surprised you're alive and suspect design.
The Many Worlds Hypothesis
Recognizing fine-tuning's improbability, some propose a multiverse of randomly ordered universes. If infinite universes exist, life-permitting ones will appear by chance.
Key requirement for probabilistic power: A multiverse only increases the odds if the values of the relevant constants and initial quantities actually vary across universes according to some distribution that samples the life‑permitting range. If the constants are fixed (or tightly correlated) across the ensemble, multiplying universes does not help—you simply replicate the same (likely life‑prohibiting) conditions many times. Thus any successful multiverse explanation must posit both (a) a parameter‑variation mechanism and (b) an appropriate measure over parameter space that gives non‑negligible weight to the life‑permitting region (see, e.g., Ellis, Kirchner & Stoeger 2004; Ellis 2011; Lewis & Barnes 2016, ch. 8; Collins 2009).
Four Major Problems:
1. Metaphysical Complexity: The many worlds hypothesis is no less metaphysical than design but violates Ockham's razor by postulating an infinitely bloated ontology rather than a single designer.
2. No Known Generation Mechanism: Any mechanism generating multiple universes likely requires fine-tuning itself. If M-theory governs the multiverse, why exactly eleven dimensions? The problem just moves up one level. Proposed mechanisms like Lee Smolin's black hole reproduction theory fail because universes fine-tuned for black hole production would generate them prior to star formation, actually weeding out life-permitting universes. Inflationary cosmology requires its own fine-tuning of the cosmological constant.
3. Lack of Independent Evidence: No evidence exists for the required world ensemble beyond the fine-tuning itself, which equally supports design. The Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem shows even multiverses must have beginnings, potentially limiting the number of universes. Design has additional support from other theistic arguments.
4. The Boltzmann Brain Problem: If our universe is random, it's vastly more probable we should observe a much smaller ordered region. Penrose notes: odds of our solar system forming by random collision (1 in 10^(10^60)) are "utter chicken feed" compared to our universe's low-entropy condition (1 in 10^(10^123)).
This leads to absurd conclusions: the most probable scenario is that you're a single brain with illusory perceptions of an orderly cosmos. No sane person believes they're a "Boltzmann brain."
Ironically, the multiverse hypothesis works best if God created and ordered it, giving preference to observable, fine-tuned worlds.
The Design Hypothesis
Dawkins' Objection: Richard Dawkins argues the Designer remains unexplained, making design no better than chance. His argument:
One of the greatest challenges to the human intellect has been to explain how the complex, improbable appearance of design in the universe arises.
The natural temptation is to attribute the appearance of design to actual design itself.
The temptation is a false one because the designer hypothesis immediately raises the larger problem of who designed the designer.
The most ingenious and powerful explanation is Darwinian evolution by natural selection.
We don’t have an equivalent explanation for physics.
We should not give up the hope of a better explanation arising in physics, something as powerful as Darwinism is for biology.
Problems with Dawkins' Argument:
Invalid Logic: The conclusion doesn't follow from the premises. At most, it suggests we shouldn't infer God from design—but this doesn't prove atheism or make belief unjustified.
False Premises:
You don't need to explain the explanation: Archaeologists can infer human artifacts without explaining the humans. If astronauts found machinery on the moon's far side, they'd justifiably infer intelligent agents without knowing who they were or how they got there.
Requiring explanations of explanations creates infinite regress, destroying science. Before any explanation could be acceptable, you'd need an explanation of it, then an explanation of that explanation, and so on infinitely.
God as pure mind is remarkably simple, not complex like the universe: As an immaterial entity without physical parts, God is startlingly simple compared to the contingent, variegated universe with its inexplicable constants and quantities.
A mind may have complex ideas, but the mind itself is simple: Dawkins confuses a mind's ideas (which may be complex) with the mind itself (an incredibly simple, spiritual entity).
Intelligence and consciousness are essential, not contingent properties of minds, unlike the contingent values of physical constants.
Conclusion
Of the three alternatives—physical necessity, chance, or design—design is most plausible. The fine-tuning argument demonstrates that neither physical necessity nor chance adequately explains the universe's life-permitting constants. The many worlds hypothesis, while attempting to multiply probabilistic resources, faces insurmountable difficulties. The design hypothesis emerges as the most plausible explanation, pointing to a Cosmic Designer who calibrated the universe's initial conditions for the emergence of intelligent life.
Modern science vindicates the ancient insights of Plato and Aristotle, providing a third argument for God's existence in our cumulative case. The design hypothesis provides the best explanation of cosmic fine-tuning, supported by independent evidence from other theistic arguments and free from the severe problems plaguing alternatives.
References
J. Warner Wallace, "Fine-Tuning of the Force Strengths to Permit Life," CrossExamined.org, August 3, 2014. Available at: https://crossexamined.org/fine-tuning-force-strengths-permit-life/
Luke A. Barnes, "The Fine-Tuning of the Universe for Intelligent Life," Publications of the Astronomical Society of Australia, 2012. Available at: http://arxiv.org/abs/1112.4647
Roger Penrose, The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of the Universe (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), pp. 762-765.
Geraint F. Lewis and Luke A. Barnes, A Fortunate Universe: Life in a Finely Tuned Cosmos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
G. F. R. Ellis, Ulrich Kirchner, and W. R. Stoeger, "Multiverses and physical cosmology," Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society 347, no. 3 (2004): 921–936. https://academic.oup.com/mnras/article/347/3/921/1021585 (see also arXiv: astro-ph/0305292).
George F. R. Ellis, "Does the Multiverse Really Exist?" Scientific American 305, no. 2 (August 2011): 38–43.
Robin Collins, "The Teleological Argument: An Exploration of the Fine-Tuning of the Universe," in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, ed. J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), esp. the section on multiverse measures.
Joel L. Lebowitz, "Time’s arrow and Boltzmann’s entropy," Scholarpedia 3(4):3448 (2008). doi:10.4249/scholarpedia.3448.
Sean M. Carroll, From Eternity to Here: The Quest for the Ultimate Theory of Time (New York: Dutton, 2010).
Sean M. Carroll and Jennifer Chen, "Spontaneous Inflation and the Origin of the Arrow of Time," arXiv:hep-th/0410270 (2004).